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Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification,
Constitutional Convergence, and Human
Rights Practice
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons*
This Article examines the adoption of rights in national constitutions in the post-World War II period in
light of claims of global convergence. Using a comprehensive database on the contents of the world’s
constitutions, we observe a qualified convergence on the content of rights. Nearly every single right has
increased in prevalence since its introduction, but very few are close to universal. We show that interna-
tional rights documents, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have shaped the
rights menu of national constitutions in powerful ways. These covenants appear to coordinate the behavior
of domestic drafters, whether or not the drafters’ countries are legally committed to the agreements (though
commitment enhances the effect). Our particular focus is on the all-important International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, whose ratification inclines countries towards rights they, apparently, would
not otherwise adopt. This finding confirms the complementary relationship between treaty ratification and
domestic constitutional norms, and suggests that one important channel of treaty efficacy may be through
domestic constitutions.
Introduction
Two decades ago, Professor Louis Henkin began his magisterial The Age of
Rights with a ringing claim of universality:
Ours is the age of rights. Human rights is the idea of our time,
the only political-moral idea that has received universal accept-
ance. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, has been ap-
proved by virtually all governments representing all societies.
Human rights are enshrined in the constitutions of virtually every
one of today’s 170 states—old states and new; religious, secular,
and atheist; Western and Eastern; democratic, authoritarian, and
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totalitarian; market economy, socialist, and mixed; rich and poor,
developed, developing and less developed. 1
The claim of the “universality” of human rights is as enticing as it is
puzzling. On the one hand, it is hard to deny the apparent ubiquity of at
least some formal rights in both international and domestic law. On the other
hand, many have questioned the genuine embrace of these rights worldwide,
and a raft of observers—from pundits to practitioners to scholars—have
questioned whether rights on paper have influenced the enjoyment of
human rights on the ground.2
This Article examines the “universalization” of human rights over the
past half a century. Numerous theories focus on the convergence of rights
around the world, by which we mean increasing similarity in legal texts and
broader discourses about rights among different countries. For example, Law
notes that the rise of globalization coincided with an increased protection of
human rights, and posits that this has involved a convergence in constitu-
tional protections accorded to rights.3 Tushnet concurs, arguing that na-
tional constitutional practice is inevitably converging under pressures of
globalization.4 Others assume that convergence has already occurred, a pat-
tern that may have crystallized even generations ago. Weinrib, for example,
identifies a postwar constitutional paradigm, developed in reaction to Na-
zism, in which equality and human dignity are central and in some ways
superior to local history and culture.5 These scholars emphasize the role of
the international environment in informing national choices about human
rights.
There has been relatively little evidence demonstrating convergence as an
empirical matter.6 Furthermore, there has been no study that shows the
mechanism by which rights may have spread to the extent they have. This
Article seeks to remedy this situation by providing comprehensive evidence
1. Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights xvii (1990).
2. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935,
1989 (2002) (finding that ratification leads in some cases to less observance of human rights); Eric A.
Posner, Why is Human Rights Law Such a Failure? (Feb. 26 2012) (on file with author) (arguing that
human rights law has been unsuccessful).
3. See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1277,
1306–07 (2008) (positing mobility as a mechanism for rights convergence).
4. Mark Tushnet, The Inevitable Globalization of Constitutional Law, 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 985, 989 (2009)
(arguing convergence is inevitable); see also Mark C. Rahdert, Comparative Constitutional Advocacy, 56 Am.
U.L. Rev. 553, 561 (2007) (arguing that convergence is occurring).
5. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Post-War Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in The Migration of
Constitutional Ideas 84, 89–90 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006).
6. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Endurance of National Con-
stitutions 25–27 (2009) (demonstrating decline in the United States as a constitutional model and the
spread of rights provisions). See also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United
States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 762 (2012) (describing the decline of the U.S. model and the rise of
Canada as a model); Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Comments on Law and Versteeg’s The
Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 2088 (2012) (arguing that
drafting cohort is an important determinant of content).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 3 11-FEB-13 15:01
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of the level of convergence and evaluating an important mechanism: the role
of international human rights documents in coordinating state behavior
with regard to national constitution making.
The evidence we present in this Article suggests there has indeed been
substantial convergence with regard to human rights. We show that the
prevalence of every right known to us, with possibly one exception, has in-
creased monotonically since the right first entered the universe of national
constitutions. We might think of the prevalence of a right as a one-way
ratchet—once introduced, the right will not leave the scene and increases in
popularity. Consequently, the number of rights included in the typical na-
tional constitution has increased steadily over the years. Also, and impor-
tantly, the number of countries with rights has increased steadily.
We also show how international law, in both its “hard” (binding) and
“soft” (nonbinding) variants, has contributed to the incorporation of many
human rights into the domestic constitutions of a significant number of
states. In particular, we present evidence that suggests the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and its complementary treaty, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), have played
crucial roles in the spread of formal human rights into national constitu-
tions. Moreover, we find that both international agreements and incorpora-
tion of the rights contained in those agreements into domestic law have
facilitated improvements in rights practices on the ground. The interna-
tional instruments, evidently, have served as crucial focal points that have
inspired political action as well as formal constitutional change.
It seems almost clich´ e, at this point, to note that human rights have dif-
fused to many parts of the globe.7 In sociology, adherents of the World
Society school claim that international human rights norms are scripts of
modernity that “reflect legitimating ideas dominant in the world system at
the time of their creation.”8 Others attribute the spread of human rights to
more general processes of political and economic globalization.9 Elkins and
Versteeg and Goderis make the point that diffusion is a major source of
norms for national constitutions.10 Law and Versteeg argue that constitu-
7. See generally Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Do-
mestic Politics (2009);  David P. Forsythe,  The Internationalization of Human Rights
(1991); Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Net-
works in International Politics (1998); The Power of Human Rights: International Norms
and Domestic Change (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
8. John Boli-Bennett & John W. Meyer, The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing
Children in National Constitutions 1870–1970, 43 Am. Soc. Rev. 797, 805 (1978); see also Christine Min
Wotipka & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and Human Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in The Global Diffusion of Mar-
ket and Democracy 303 (Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008).
9. Law, supra note 3, at 1343; see also Weinrib, supra note 5; Tushnet, supra note 4; Rahdert, supra note
4.
10. Zachary Elkins, Designed by Diffusion: International Networks and the Spread of Democracy
(Fall 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with author);
Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Transnational Origins of Constitutions: An Empirical Investigation\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 4 11-FEB-13 15:01
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tional treatment of human rights falls into two different models: libertarian
and statist.11 Parallel to this literature, a growing number of empirical stud-
ies have begun to document how, if at all, the globalization of legal norms
has affected actual human rights practices on the ground. Some of these
studies have been skeptical that constitutional rights or the ratification of
human rights treaties12 translate directly into better human rights practices.
Recent research, however, suggests that treaties are quite effective instru-
ments for rights improvements when there is the opportunity for political
and/or legal mobilization to demand effective implementation.13
This Article fleshes out a plausible mechanism behind the domestic mo-
bilization for international human rights: the incorporation of these rights
into domestic constitutions. We argue that the ratification of treaties pro-
duces both a direct as well as a mediated influence on domestic respect for
human rights via constitutional incorporation. We use data from the Com-
parative Constitutions Project (“CCP”), a comprehensive effort by two of
the authors to study the contents of the world’s constitutions since 1789, to
explore three related questions.14 First, is there any evidence that countries
actually incorporate into their constitutions the particular human rights rec-
ipes found in major international documents? Second, does ratification make
any difference in the probability of such incorporation occurring?15 And
third, has the transmission of rights from international to national covenants
(if that has indeed occurred) affected rights performance on the ground?
Our answers to all three questions are affirmative. We find that the inter-
national instruments have a powerful coordinating effect on the contents of
(6th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Working Paper Series, 2011) available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1906707 (citing diffusion as a major source of rights provisions).
11. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal. L.
Rev. 1163, 1170 (2011).
12. See Linda Camp Keith, Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977–1996): Are They
More Than Mere “Window Dressing?”, 55 Pol. Res. Q. 111 passim (2002) (constitutional rights);
Hathaway, supra note 2 (human rights instruments); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 Am. J. Soc. 1373, 1374 (2005)
(human rights instruments).
13. Simmons,  supra  note 7 (providing evidence for the role of social groups in making rights
effective).
14. We have identified 935 unique constitutional systems since 1789, and have gathered data on
roughly two-thirds of these cases. The sample for the present Article includes 549 of the world’s 801
constitutions written during this period. Most countries of the world now have a document identified as
a constitution integrated into a single document. See Comparative Constitutions Project, www.
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Comparative Constitutions
Project]. For a small number of countries (Israel for example), we rely on a series of documents that form
the highest normative level in the legal system. See id. We exclude the United Kingdom entirely from
our analysis, as the decision rule for what statutes and norms count as constitutional is quite complex. See
Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Divided Societies 16 n.7 (2010) (noting that the Brit-
ish Constitution is a different model).
15. Here we focus on the ICCPR, which, unlike the UDHR, is a binding international instrument
that requires state ratification to be effective. We ask whether the act of ICCPR ratification increases the
likelihood that a government will make its constitution explicitly compatible with its international
human rights obligations.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 5 11-FEB-13 15:01
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national constitutions. This is an important finding, as it is analytically
challenging to evaluate the effect of specific mechanisms of constitutional
convergence. We also find that ratification is important, and that binding
international law leads to new rights in subsequently adopted national con-
stitutions. Finally, we show that normative convergence has been accompa-
nied by changes in actual human rights practice.
Our finding has implications for the literature on constitutional conver-
gence as well as for international law. For constitutional convergence, we
show that constitution making is embedded in a broader transnational con-
text. Formal participation in international regimes has an impact on domes-
tic constitution making. This finding also suggests that international law is
most effective when it works through domestic institutions, including con-
stitutional structures. The international and constitutional levels of govern-
ance are mutually reinforcing and complementary.
The Article begins by reviewing existing theories of normative conver-
gence in Part I and offering our own account. Part II then provides descrip-
tive evidence of the increasing propensity for national constitutions to
include rights. It shows a general upward trend, accelerating after World
War II. Part III turns to the UDHR as a template for national constitutions,
showing how the UDHR had a coordinating effect on which rights were
adopted. Part IV looks at the effects of ratification, focusing especially on
the case of the ICCPR. Part V turns to the question of whether international
ratification makes a difference in actual outcomes on the ground, in terms of
better rights protection. Part VI concludes.
I. Theories of Convergence
Before turning to our empirical examination, let us briefly consider the
mechanisms by which international instruments and national practices
might influence each other. The UDHR was designed to express fundamen-
tal values of the community of nations, and to articulate the importance of
human rights in the wake of World War II. The UDHR was not designed
to be legally binding. But which rights were, or are, fundamental? By in-
cluding some rights and excluding others, the UDHR implied that some
rights are more important than others, and such a statement might plausibly
have influenced national policymakers.16
How were the rights listed in the UDHR chosen? Clearly its menu of
rights reflected many norms that had first been instantiated in national con-
stitutional practice, particularly those of Western nations. Some have even
claimed that human rights are a Western imposition.17 But scholars examin-
16. For background on the drafting of the UDHR, see, for example, Simmons, supra note 7.
17. See Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity 82 (2001) (describing views of
Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamed).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 6 11-FEB-13 15:01
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ing the drafting of the UDHR have demonstrated the important role of
smaller countries like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, and other non-Western
powers like China, in pushing for inclusion of human rights in the U.N.
Charter.18 Articles 22 through 27, which address socio-economic rights,
were promoted not just by the Soviet bloc but also by Latin American,
Asian, and Middle Eastern countries.19 Thus, the UDHR reflected the cul-
mination of a long-standing international political movement, and was not
simply an imposition of powerful Western states.20 It was, however, unen-
forceable as a legal document.
One interesting—but often inscrutable—matter concerns the mechanism
of diffusion of these norms. Certainly, convergence can occur from any com-
bination of the many processes of interdependence that surface in discussions
of policy adoption. Scholars have typologized this interdependence in vari-
ous ways.21 A central question is whether any purported convergence in
rights is coordinated or not by international arrangements or actors as op-
posed to being subject to a more horizontal, peer to peer, set of processes. In
the former instance, we would expect convergence to conform to the exam-
ple set by international or regional covenants; in the latter, we would expect
a pattern of adoption by which national models appear as core documents.
As is well known, the normative consensus embodied in the UDHR took
legal form only later through the two international covenants promulgated
in 1966: the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).22 It is sometimes asserted, though it has
not yet been empirically documented, that these legal instruments, together
with the UDHR, have formed the basis for national bills of rights, in which
case we would expect that the international instruments have served as a
mechanism of convergence.23 In this case, convergence is a product of the
reciprocal relationship between constitutions and treaties, as the two levels
mutually construct the script of rights.
18. See Susan Waltz, Universalizing Human Rights: The Role of Small States in the Construction of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 44, 49–66 (2001) (describing the role of small
states); Susan Waltz, Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 23
Third World Q. 437, 442–46 (2002) [hereinafter Waltz, Reclaiming] (emphasizing breadth of contribu-
tions from a range of countries).
19. See Waltz, Reclaiming, supra note 18, at 444. Note that some of the “second generation” rights,
such as a right to education, had been instantiated in national constitutions since the latter part of the
nineteenth century, and are associated with the rise of the welfare state.
20. Id. at 439–41.
21. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins, Constitutional Networks, in Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and
Governance 43 (Miles Kahler ed., 2009) (describing several possible modes of policy interdependence
among states); The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy (Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dob-
bin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008) (same).
22. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 179 (1995) (discussing bifurcation
of covenants).
23. Id. at 180–81.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-FEB-13 15:01
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In the human rights realm, Goodman and Jinks divide mechanisms into
three categories: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation,24 a typology not
too dissimilar from others developed in other substantive domains.25 Coer-
cion occurs when states seek to encourage others to adopt norms, either
through carrots or sticks.26 In the present context, this might occur when
one state forces another to adopt a set of international or national human
rights norms, either through pressure to sign international instruments or
constitutional imposition.27 Persuasion is when one actor convinces another
that norms are worth adopting, and involves a form of learning.28 Accultura-
tion, in contrast, occurs when actors internalize the idea that norms should
be adopted through some sort of “logic of appropriateness,” in March and
Olson’s widely-used phrasing.29 In this sense, the idea of acculturation sug-
gests that decision makers take in a broader, less direct, set of influences.
Summarizing studies from the earlier World Society literature, Goodman
and Jinks argue that these analyses demonstrate the important role of accul-
turation in both the spread and impact of human rights.30 They note that
neither wealth nor external pressure seem to be sufficient explanations of the
spread of rights discourse. Rather, they suggest that acculturation of state
actors is the primary mechanism by which rights spread.31 Constitutional
rights and international rights share the same ideological origins, and the
same experience of isomorphic diffusion which, in their account, bears little
or no relation to conditions on the ground.
Goodman and Jinks speculate that such cultural processes might work in
a number of ways. Government decisionmakers might themselves be accul-
turated to adopt particular norms.32 Alternatively, acculturation might oc-
cur through transnational interest groups that seek to change norms and
behavior.33 Finally, acculturation might occur at the level of the mass pub-
lic, which then pressures leaders to adopt shared norms.34 For all these accul-
24. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights
Law, 54 Duke L.J. 621, 630–38 (2004) (describing the three mechanisms).
25. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins & Beth A. Simmons, Globalization and Policy Diffusion: Explaining Three
Decades of Liberalization, in Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transi-
tion 275 (Milers Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003) (in the context of economic policy).
26. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 633.
27. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul. . .Constitution Making
in Occupied States, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1139, 1154 (2008).
28. Zachary Elkins & Beth A. Simmons, On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 33, 42–45 (2005); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 635.
29. See James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Logic of Appropriateness, ARENA Working Paper 04/09,
available at http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/
working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 638.
30. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 646–53.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 654.
33. See generally Keck & Sikkink, supra note 7; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational
Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society, in The Social Movement Society 217 (David S. Meyer &
Sidney Tarrow eds., 1998).
34. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 24, at 654–55.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 8 11-FEB-13 15:01
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turation-based accounts, we might expect that the international instruments
would serve as both evidence of global norms, and also as channels through
which national decisionmakers are acculturated. We should thus expect
some impact of the adoption of the international instruments.
In a recent contribution, Law argues that competition for skilled labor in
a globalized economy provides a mechanism for convergence in terms of
rights protection.35 His argument is that high-end workers prefer a package
of policies that are protective of civil and political liberties, and so states
competing for such workers will have to adopt rights.36 In Law’s theory, the
race-to-the-top provides the mechanism for the spread of rights. The inde-
pendent effect of the international instruments is quite limited in this story,
so we would likely observe very little difference in the counterfactual world
with no international covenants.
Law and Versteeg posit several other mechanisms by which constitutions
could converge.37 First, constitutions might converge in content as a result
of learning.38 As countries learn what works and does not work in other
contexts, they may imitate each other. This can involve a more-or-less ra-
tional process of institutional adoption, but also can reflect cognitive biases
that lead to imitation.39 Second, and closely related to the first mechanism,
they argue that constitution makers may conform to external norms in order
to win acceptance from other nations.40 Third, they posit the existence of
constitutional networks, whereby the benefit of adopting a particular provi-
sion increases with the number of other countries that have the same
provision.41
To summarize, we find many expectations of convergence in the litera-
ture. We have relatively little systematic evidence that convergence has oc-
curred. We also have much theoretical disagreement about the manner in
which convergence occurs, and very little direct evidence from constitutional
drafters. Some theories privilege horizontal channels of diffusion, in which
case we ought to expect that international instruments would have relatively
little impact. Other theories focus on acculturation and socialization, and
would expect some convergence as a result of the internationalization of
rights.
We investigate three channels through which human rights law, domestic
and/or international, improves human rights on the ground: (1) direct treaty
effects, by which governments change their behavior in response to the spe-
35. Law, supra note 3, at 1329–30.
36. Id. at 1304–07. But see Holning Lau, Human Rights and Globalization: Putting the Race to the Top in
Perspective, 102 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 319, 319 (2008) (cautioning against use of race-to-the-top
metaphor).
37. Law & Versteeg, supra note 11, at 1171–87. R
38. Id. at 1173–75.
39. Id. at 1174.
40. Id. at 1177–79 (offering example of Meiji Japan).
41. Id. at 1183–87.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 9 11-FEB-13 15:01
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cific prescriptions or proscriptions of an international obligation without
necessarily adjusting their domestic law; (2) direct constitutional effects, which
imply that government-rights behavior is constrained by the content of the
domestic constitution in the absence of international treaty; and (3) indirect
treaty effects, by which treaty ratification stimulates a demand for local
changes, which in turn increase the likelihood that the rights contained in
the treaty will be constitutionalized, and thereby become a tool for domestic
legal as well as political mobilization.
Support for these last two “constitutional” channels comports with an
emerging theme of the new literature on the efficacy of international human
rights law, which asserts that effective human rights protection requires pro-
pitious domestic institutions and conditions.42 Human rights law does not
implement itself. Instead it requires social actors to mobilize around it and
to demand changes on the ground. Treaties can play a role by mobilizing
domestic forces, which, in turn, encourage the incorporation of treaty com-
mitments into domestic law. We conclude that international law matters
when local activists, courts and others are able to utilize it in domestic prac-
tice, and that constitutional incorporation is one mechanism by which the
international legal regime for human rights has an impact locally.
II. Evidence on Convergence: Rights in National
Constitutions
We now turn to an examination of patterns by which national constitu-
tions have adopted rights from historical constitutions and international
covenants. We draw on the Comparative Constitutions Project, which
records the content of national constitutions as well as international instru-
ments, for all constitutions of independent nation-states since 1789. The
project includes information on political institutions, judicial systems, and
many other aspects of the formal text, including rights.43
We analyze a sample of 680 constitutional “systems,” from a sample of
839 historical systems promulgated between 1789 and 2006. In our concep-
tualization of a constitutional system, minor revisions and amendments oc-
cur  within  the same system, but wholesale replacements initiate a new
system.44 We analyze systems in the year of their promulgation, and not
their subsequent amendments, and thus we evaluate the decisions of a sys-
tem’s original drafters. Our coverage of constitutions is better in the post-
World War II period, including well over ninety percent of the documents
42. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and
Quantitative Eyes, 61 World Pol. 360 (2009) (reviewing the literature on human rights efficacy); see also
Simmons, supra note 7.
43. For more on the project please see Comparative Constitutions Project, supra note 14.
44. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton,
The Endurance of National Constitutions 50–51 (2009).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 10 11-FEB-13 15:01
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adopted after 1945, but we have no reason to expect that our sample for the
pre-World War II period is systematically biased in significant ways. Sys-
tems excluded from the sample are largely those whose texts are hard to
track down and thus tend to be short-lived, older, and less widely known.
We also analyze seven major international covenants with human rights pro-
visions, including the UDHR and the ICCPR—two covenants that we ana-
lyze in some depth. We chose these seven covenants as the most prominent
global and regional treaties covering a range of human rights.
Historically, constitutions have, on average, included an average of
twenty-two rights from the set of seventy-four rights listed in the Appendix.
See below for a description of how we identified these seventy-four. Figure 1
provides the distribution of the number of rights found across the 680 con-
stitutional cases.
Figure 1: Distribution in the Number of Rights Provided in
National Constitutions (n = 680)
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Figure 2: Number of Rights Provided in National
Constitutions, by Year (n = 680)
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Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the number of rights according to the
adoption year of the constitutions. As the literature suggests, we find that
the average number of rights in constitutions has increased over time—
presumably, many constitutions are incorporating new rights while retain-
ing older ones. However, not all modern constitutions absorb the new
rights; the scatterplot shows a marked increase in the variance in the num-
ber of rights over time. While many modern constitutions contain large
rights sections, a fair number of them have rights sections no larger than
those of the typical nineteenth century constitution.45
As for the international covenants, those that we coded include, on aver-
age, roughly thirty or so rights from the seventy-four in the CCP survey. For
their time, then, these charters included a rather lengthy set of rights,
hardly surprising given their nominal purposes. Figure 2 shows that very
few constitutions included this many rights prior to 1945. We count twelve
constitutions—all in Latin America—that included more than twenty-five
45. A small handful of constitutions do not incorporate any rights, at least not directly. These consti-
tutions are those of: Bhutan (1953); France (1875); Haiti (1811); Latvia (1922); Lesotho (1983); Malawi
(1966); Mauritania (1985); New Zealand (1852); Poland (1992); Soviet Union (1924); South Africa
(1961); South Africa (1983); and Thailand (1976). At the other extreme, there are fourteen or so recent
constitutions (all from developing countries) that provide over 50 rights each. The rights-heavy constitu-
tions and their year of adoption are those of: Slovenia (1991); Ukraine (1996); Slovakia (1992); Yugosla-
via (Serbia) (2003); Romania (1991); Portugal (1976); Paraguay (1992); Ethiopia (1994); Brazil (1988);
Nicaragua (1987); Cape Verde (1980); Colombia (1991); Venezuela (1999); and Yugoslavia (Serbia)
(2006).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 12 11-FEB-13 15:01
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rights prior to this time, with most of these including roughly thirty
rights.46 Thus the international bill of rights represented an expansion in the
number of rights-claims on the “menu” for most nation-states.
The Appendix identifies the seventy-four rights included in the CCP sur-
vey and provides some sense of their popularity by era. We constructed our
survey instrument—which covers 667 different elements of constitutions,
including many unrelated to rights—by surveying a large number of consti-
tutional texts and then soliciting the views of an international advisory
board. Our objective was to compile a highly inclusive set of rights in order
to perform a comprehensive inventory of each document. The result was a
list of seventy-four rights. Our survey also asks about rights not found in our
survey instrument, so in theory we have a comprehensive list.
Were we to plot the popularity of each of the seventy-four rights across
time (that is, the percentage of constitutions that provide the right, by year),
almost every figure would show an upward trajectory. This pattern suggests
that rights, once introduced, generally spread across countries and maintain
their popularity (at least in the aggregate, if not within countries over time).
Not only are rights—of almost all kinds—seeping into the political founda-
tions of states, but the menu of rights available to drafters is expanding as
well. There are, of course, some rights that fail to take off, but these are few.
Really, the only four rights in our survey that show anything close to a
negative or flat trajectory over time after having enjoyed some popularity in
the nineteenth century are the right to bear arms, the right to citizenship of
those born in the state’s jurisdiction (jus soli citizenship), intellectual prop-
erty rights, and the right to a jury trial. In the case of arms, the right really
never took off—such protections were never central outside the Americas
and were quite contested even within that region.
Then there is the question of universality. Some rights—for example,
freedom of expression and freedom of religion—appear to be so central that
almost nine of every ten contemporary constitutions include them. The vast
majority of rights, however, have penetrated fewer than half of contemporary
constitutions and appear to be optional constitutional features. This distri-
bution suggests the distinct possibility of different rights templates, if not a
fully ` a la carte process. Some of this diversity is likely rooted in divergent
political and social values among countries—for example, the right to
health, as the U.S. experience makes clear, is clearly not for every country. It
is also probably the case that drafters across countries have different tastes
about scope. Some may view a broad list of, say, forty-five rights as insuffi-
ciently parsimonious.
It is worth commenting briefly on trends within the various substantive
domains. In economic and social areas, for example, we witness a moderate
46. These constitutions are those of: Paraguay (1870); Bolivia (1945); Honduras (1936); Bolivia
(1938); Paraguay (1940); Mexico (1857); Mexico (1917); Guatemala (1945); Costa Rica (1871); Uruguay
(1934); Uruguay (1938); and Cuba (1940).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 13 11-FEB-13 15:01
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but noticeable shift after World War II. These “second generation” rights,
it seems, do expand in coverage after the UDHR, but are still not found in a
majority of constitutions. (See the Appendix for three “snapshots” of each
right’s prevalence). We also observe some economic and social rights that
emerge before the postwar boom. The right to join a trade union is more
extensive and predates the right to strike, which penetrates twenty percent
of constitutions only with the burst of post-socialist constitutions in the
1990s. Rights to property, of course, have had a long tradition in constitu-
tional systems and continue to be prevalent. In that light, it is somewhat
surprising that constitutional commitment to intellectual property rights
has not increased over time. For developing countries that do not produce
much intellectual property, this may reflect a paradigmatic “substitute” dy-
namic (that is, substituting international commitments for domestic ones),
wherein commitments are directed primarily at outside actors through
treaty, and so there is no additional value to adding a commitment in the
constitution.
Criminal procedure rights are classic “first generation” rights and observe
steadier upward trajectories beginning in the nineteenth century.47 For some
provisions, such as the right to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 10 of the
UDHR, and the presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 11, there
seems to have been an upward spike in adoption after the UDHR. The
rights to a public trial and to be immune from ex post facto law, on the other
hand, were already popular before the UDHR, though they also exhibit up-
ward trends. This suggests that the effect of the UDHR was greater in coor-
dinating national norms with regard to a fair trial than a public trial. On the
other hand, we also see an upward spike with regard to the right to counsel
(not contained in the UDHR) intensifying after its inclusion in the ICCPR.
International instruments seem to influence the norm against torture in
an interesting and significant way. Torture is prohibited by the UDHR and
the ICCPR, but, despite this, only a minority of constitutional texts men-
tioned it into the 1980s. When the Torture Convention came into force in
1984, it was followed by a significant increase in the number of countries
with constitutional prohibitions.48
The only rights that truly appear universal (found, say, in more than
ninety percent of constitutions) at the end of the twentieth century are a few
of the classic first generation rights: freedom of religion, freedom of expres-
sion, and freedom of assembly and association. Prohibitions on slavery and
47. Matthew C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development 8 (1995) (describing first, second, and third
generation rights).
48. 137 out of 166 constitutions adopted after 1984 explicitly ban torture. Of constitutions adopted
before 1984, the comparable figure is 187 out of 552 constitutions. Data on file with authors. This
increase is not surprising because Article 2 of the Convention explicitly requires the adoption of legisla-
tive measures to prohibit torture. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-FEB-13 15:01
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the right to privacy are also quite widespread. Rights of petition and free-
dom of the press are less widespread. In terms of the rights most affected by
the international instruments, it seems that some of the criminal procedure
rights exhibit the most significant shifts: the right to a public and fair trial
and to the assistance of counsel reflect important features about the organi-
zation of legal systems, and play a role in protecting other rights, to the
extent they are justiciable. Below, we investigate these apparent patterns in
somewhat more depth.
III. Forging a Template: The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
The major effort to institutionalize and universalize an international
human rights regime dates from just after World War II. The contents of a
new global regime for human rights was the first order of business of the
new Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, established in
1946, for which the initial goal was to pass a non-binding, yet authoritative,
statement of the broad panoply of rights that all sovereign states should
observe vis-` a-vis their own people.49
Of course, this effort to forge a set of global standards did not begin de
novo. In fact, U.N. actors worked with their own set of templates, which
presumably derived from another set of templates, and so on.50 We will
assume that these inheritances go back more or less ad infinitem, but given
the abrupt post-World War II changes, it is convenient to begin our story in
1948.51 U.N. negotiators drew from not only salient historical documents
such as the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, but also from the
constitutions of the home countries of the negotiators.52 It may come as a
surprise, however, to learn that what would become the UDHR was hardly a
carbon copy of the constitutions of the most powerful states. For example,
our analysis suggests that despite the hegemonic position of the United
States, the UDHR only weakly resembled the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of
Rights. Here, we compare the content of the UDHR to that of each of the
seventy-six constitutions in effect in 1948 for which we have data (a small
number of constitutions are missing in our 1948 sample). Our measure of
similarity here is the proportion of some seventy-two rights on which any
two documents match, in that both include or both exclude the right.
(These seventy-two rights represent any right from the list of seventy-four in
the Appendix that has been included in at least five percent of constitutions
at any given time since 1789.) We observe that the configuration of rights
49. See generally Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins,
Drafting, and Intent (1999).
50. See id. at xiv (strong influence of Latin American socialist ideas).
51. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 22–29 (emphasizing World War II as a key turning point).
52. See Morsink, supra note 49, at 46, 257, 261 (examples of constitutional influence).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-FEB-13 15:01
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in the UDHR is quite different from that of the aged U.S. Constitution,
which ranks in the bottom fifth in terms of similarity to the UDHR.53 The
match with the French constitution of 1946 is much better, perhaps due to
the participation of influential Frenchmen such as Rene Cassin in the draft-
ing of the UDHR, as well as the fact that the French constitution was writ-
ten only two years earlier.54 Rights provisions in the prevailing constitutions
of the other U.N. Security Council members do not bear any particular simi-
larity to the eventual UDHR. The similarities of the Soviet and Chinese
constitutions to the UDHR are just slightly above the sample average. And
while we cannot make a precise comparison with the unwritten British con-
stitution, it seems fair to say that the content of what was to become the
founding document of the modern international human rights regime was
not dictated by the practices of the dominant powers alone.
This result is consistent with Waltz’s and Morsink’s descriptions of the
influence of smaller countries on the drafting of the UDHR.55 Indeed, the
constitutions most similar to the UDHR are those of Haiti (1946) and Ice-
land (1944), which were still hot off the press in 1948. These constitutions,
as well as those of France and Japan, both of whose post-war constitutions
are highly similar to the UDHR, suggest the most robust pattern is that the
UDHR is a product of its generation. Indeed, the only distinguishable pat-
tern in the regression models that we have run of the similarity of antece-
dent constitutions to the UDHR is that of the constitution’s age.56 The
generation effect appears to be quite pronounced: for every 100 years of age,
constitutions are eight points less similar to the UDHR, which represents a
shift of almost two standard deviations in the measure of similarity.57 Con-
trast this effect with some null effects. The state-level factors that do not
predict similarity to the UDHR include a state’s level of development (as mea-
sured by an index of energy consumption and urbanization), its population
size (despite Waltz’s impression mentioned above), its geographic region, its
membership in the U.N. Security Council, and its status as one of the allied powers
in World War II.58 The lack of any systematic pattern in the data—apart
from the age of a state’s constitution—is striking. The finding suggests
that, while the world powers very likely exerted influence over the process of
writing the UDHR, drafting process was not characterized by the imposi-
tion of the constitutional norms of these states. Rather, the process seems to
have been one in which drafters capitalized on contemporary trends in rights
53. Cf. Law & Versteeg, supra note 11 (claiming that U.S. influence was at its highest in this period R
without any data on prior years).
54. See Morsink, supra note 49, at 8–10 (discussing the role of Cassin).
55. See Waltz, Reclaiming, supra note 18, at 444; see also Waltz, Universalizing, supra note 18; Mor-
sink, supra note 49, at xiv.
56. The dependent variable here is the similarity measure as described above, and the units are the
seventy-six constitution-UDHR dyads.
57. Analysis on file with authors.
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protection that had begun to manifest in recent constitution making epi-
sodes across a varied set of countries.
The importance of the UDHR to the elaboration of international treaty
law is well known,59 but what is less appreciated is the extent to which this
document also influenced the rights content of new constitutions that were
adopted in its wake.60 For a large number of countries torn asunder by the
war, as well as for a growing population of newly independent countries, the
UDHR presented a broadly accepted menu of rights viewed internationally
as legitimate. Their highly consensual origin meant these rights retained a
neutral quality that would be especially attractive to actors working in the
wake of political rupture, when it is critical that new governing principles
not be perceived as the biased program of one faction. The UDHR’s highly
inclusive incorporation of both classical negative rights and positive rights
(in Articles 22 through 26) no doubt contributed to its attractiveness. In
addition to its balance between positive and negative rights, adoption of a
template with which other countries have had some experience may have
had the additional advantage of providing information about what rights
were useful. For these reasons, international human rights standards are
likely to be viewed as norms with a relatively high degree of legitimacy by
polities in the market for new governing principles.
The evidence we have gathered suggests the UDHR very likely did play
such a role. Prima facie evidence can be found in the number and type of
human rights provisions included in national constitutions written in the
years following the adoption of the UDHR. Data from the CCP show that
the UDHR contributed to an expansion in the number of rights enumerated
by drafters. Of the set of seventy-four rights that the CCP tracks, the
UDHR contains thirty-five distinct rights, while constitutions in force in
1948 contained, on average, only eighteen. To be sure, the number of rights
in constitutions has grown steadily since the first modern constitutions of
the early 1800s, and even a mean of eighteen represents nearly a forty per-
cent increase compared with the thirteen rights to be found, on average, in
1850.61 But growth from 1789 until 1948 was decidedly incremental, in
part because older constitutions like that of United States were only infre-
quently updated. By contrast, the average number of rights spikes notice-
ably in the several years following 1948. In part, this spike is due to an
increase in the number of new constitutions introduced after World War II
(that is, more constitutions are updated then). However, even controlling for
new constitutional starts, 1948 appears to represent an abrupt shift in rights
volume. As one indicator, the nine constitutions written in 1947 contain an
59. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 19. R
60. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International
Law, 25 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 287, 289 (1995).
61. See generally Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 6. R\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-FEB-13 15:01
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average of 17.6 rights, while the six written in 1949 contain an average of
31 rights!
Moreover, it appears a block of constitutions highly similar to the UDHR
emerged very soon after 1948. Figure 3 indicates a significant upward shift
in the similarity to the UDHR among constitutions written after 1948, an
indication that the particular menu of rights advocated by the UDHR had
its adherents. In the graphs, each dot represents a national constitution, situ-
ated on the x-axis by year of adoption. The y-axis represents the level of
similarity between the rights menu in the constitution and that of the speci-
fied international instrument. The dashed line indicates the year of adoption
of the instrument. In terms of similarity to the UDHR, we observe that the
cluster of dots after 1948 is higher than those below 1948. The upward
boost in similarity is even greater for the ICCPR, which we discuss in the
following sections. Further, Figure 3 suggests that the rights contained in
modern constitutions seem to have diverged from those contained in older
documents, such as the French Declaration on the Rights of Man.
Figure 3: Similarity Between National Constitutions and
Selected Rights Covenants
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Another way to think about the effect of the UDHR is to analyze changes
at the level of the right, not the constitution. It would seem that, absent
their inclusion in the UDHR, some rights would have been adopted at
lower rates than they actually were. We can analyze this possibility by track-
ing the evolution of particular rights over time. Some trends are evident by\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-FEB-13 15:01
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tracking the prevalence of first-generation rights. Rights relating to crimi-
nal procedures serve as an illuminating example. Those criminal procedure
rights that were enshrined in the UDHR, such as the right to a fair trial
(Article 10), and presumption of innocence (Article 11), seem to exhibit an
especially steep upward spike after 1948,62 while other aspects of the rights
of the accused not included in the UDHR show no apparent increase in
popularity.63 There is a moderate but noticeable shift after World War II in
the inclusion in domestic constitutions of economic and social rights, or
“second generation rights” such as those contained in the UDHR, although
these rights are still not found in a majority of constitutions.
In order to assess the effect of UDHR inclusion on the popularity of a
right, it is helpful to think in quasi-experimental terms with, for example,
an interrupted time-series design. In such a design, we can treat rights as
the unit of analysis, their popularity as the outcome of interest, and inclu-
sion in the UDHR as the intervention or treatment. Of course, the post-
World War II era was transformational in many ways—not just because of
the introduction of the UDHR—and so a comparison group allows us to
isolate the effect of UDHR inclusion over and above any other contemporary
influences. That is to say, all rights exploded in popularity after World War
II for reasons not limited to the UDHR; the question is whether those in-
cluded in the UDHR were especially explosive in their growth.
In Figure 4, we plot the popularity of each right by its UDHR “status”
(that is, whether the right was eventually included or not in the UDHR).
Popularity here is calculated as the proportion of constitutions with the
right, averaged across rights in each “kind” by year. The figure suggests
that rights in both groups have become increasingly prevalent, but those
included in the UDHR grew at a faster rate for most of the period (even
before 1948) than those excluded from the UDHR. After World War II, the
slope increases for both sets but it appears that the slope for those included
in the UDHR veers more sharply upward, suggesting their inclusion in the
UDHR may have accelerated their incorporation into domestic law.
62. See plots in Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Reports, Constitution Making
Project, available at http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/right_to_a_fair_trial.pdf (right to a fair
trial), and http://www.constitutionmaking.org/files/presumption_of_innocence.pdf (presumption of
innocence).
63. See plots in Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Reports, Constitution Making
Project,  available at http://www.constitutionmaking.org/reports.html (various reports on criminal
procedure).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-FEB-13 15:01
2013 / Getting to Rights 79
Figure 4: Average prevalence of “UDHR rights”  versus “non-
UDHR rights,”  by year
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We can analyze the effect more systematically with a count model in
which, again, the unit of analysis is the right (that is, freedom of expression,
freedom of religion, etc.), with a sample of seventy-four rights. The depen-
dent variable is the number of constitutions written after 1948 (with a sam-
ple of 350 constitutions) that include the right. The explanatory variables
include (1) the percentage of constitutions providing the right circa 1948,
which captures a right’s baseline level of popularity; (2) the age of the right,
measured as the difference between the first year of its introduction in a
national constitution and 1948; and (3) a binary variable indicating whether
or not the right was included in the UDHR. We estimate the model with a
Poisson regression and report the estimates as incidence rate ratios (i.r.r.) in
Table 1. The ratios can be interpreted as the shift in the odds that a consti-
tution will contain a particular right, such that any value greater than one
indicates an increased probability of having the right.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-FEB-13 15:01
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Table 1: Explaining the Prevalence of a Right in
Post-1948 Constitutions64
Dependent variable: number of post-1948 constitutions that include each right
Universe: rights in national constitutions
Variable Incident Rate Ratio (s.e.)
Proportion in 1948 4.74
(.23)
Age in 1948 1.16
(.04)
Present in UDHR 1.53
(.03)
N7 3
Pseudo R-squared .61
Not surprisingly, the prevalence of the right in 1948 is highly predictive
of future popularity (i.r.r. = 4.74), suggesting a previously universal right
would be almost five times as likely to occur as one that was previously
nonexistent. Also, the age of the right (in 100s of years) has a mildly posi-
tive effect as well: a shift of 100 years increases the incidence rate by a factor
of 1.16, indicating that “older” rights are more likely to appear in post-
1948 constitutions than younger ones. More importantly for our purposes,
we observe a strong positive effect of the inclusion in the UDHR on a right’s
future prevalence. In fact, the incidence rate ratio of 1.53 for that variable
suggests that inclusion in the UDHR increases the likelihood of the right’s
inclusion in a constitution by more than fifty percent. This sizable effect
suggests that, on the whole, the UDHR provided a set of focal rights from
which many polities drew to design their own post-war constitutions.65
These are, of course, highly aggregated effects. Our data allows us to look
at specific rights whose fates in national constitutions seem particularly in-
fluenced by the UDHR. On the one hand, some otherwise obscure constitu-
tional rights seem to have taken off because of the UDHR. For example, in
1948 not a single national constitution in force recognized either the right
to “enjoy the benefits of science” or the right to the “free development of
one’s personality.”66 However, these two rights are prescribed in ten percent
and twenty-two percent, respectively, of the 350 constitutions written since
64. n = 73. Unit of analysis is the right (listed in the Appendix). Poisson regression. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
65. As an alternative to this model, we plan to run a time-series count model, which maps more
precisely onto the interrupted time-series design we sketch above. We also plan to extend the analysis to
the other international covenants, in particular the ICCPR.
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then. With the apparent assistance of the UDHR, at least six rights evolved
from ones provided by a distinct minority of constitutions to ones provided
by a large majority (that is, right to life, prohibition on ex post facto punish-
ment, right to join a trade union, presumption of innocence in trial, right to
free movement, and the prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment). On
the other hand, it seems plausible that the right to a jury trial (a decrease of
53%), the prohibition on censorship (a decrease of 31%), the right to peti-
tion (a decrease of 34%), intellectual property rights (a decrease of 23%),
prohibitions on child employment (a decrease of 11%), and the right to a
free press (a decrease of 9%) may have fallen out of fashion in part due to
their exclusion from the UDHR.67 These patterns are consistent with the
view that the UDHR had a powerful “template” influence on domestic con-
stitutions in the early post-war years.
IV. Ratification and Incorporation: The Case of the ICCPR
If international law has influenced formal legal rights through its power
as a template for the crafting of national constitutions, there are good rea-
sons to expect binding, ratified accords to have similar effects through dis-
tinct channels. Binding treaties raise issues of legal consistency for states in a
much more immediate way than do non-binding agreements, even ones as
important as the UDHR. We expect that treaty ratification has an indepen-
dent effect on the probability that the rights contained in the treaty will even-
tually be reflected in the domestic constitution. Specifically, we expect states
that ratify a binding international obligation to incorporate those rights into
their constitutions at a higher rate than those that do not. Moreover, we
expect this treaty effect on incorporation to be over and above any effect
associated with the earlier exposure of all countries to the norms contained
in the UDHR.
Our theory linking the ratification of a human rights treaty with the
constitutional incorporation of the rights contained in that treaty is built
upon two ideas: signals and supplements. Signaling refers to the idea that con-
stitutional laws, as the highest legal instrument in a state, send a message
about the priority of particular policies.68 Supplementing refers to the com-
plementarities of adopting the same right at multiple levels of government.
The idea is that adoption of norms at multiple levels of government height-
ens the effectiveness of those norms.
67. If we look carefully at some of these rights, it seems probable some instances of decline had
nothing to do with the right’s omission from the UDHR. The right to bear arms, for example, whose
popularity decreased 82% (from 7% of constitutions to 1%), was already on the decline. The same is true
of debtors’ rights, which decreased 23% in their prevalence.
68. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. Legal Stud. 83, 85 (2002) (explaining the signaling
value of constitutional rights).\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 22 11-FEB-13 15:01
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We begin by positing, in each country, a set of elites that we call the
constitutional coalition, with control over the constitutional text.69 For all
countries, constitutional commitments carry unique weight in terms of au-
thority. This is true for countries in which the constitution is a legally en-
forceable document, as is typical of democracies, because the constitution
will trump ordinary law and policy. But it is also true for countries such as
China, in which the constitution is used to indicate fundamental policies,
even if the document is not legally justiciable.70 For both democracies and
autocracies, then, constitutions are used as signals of policy goals, expressing
fundamental values of the constitutional coalition. Crucially, we assume it is
costly for a country to include a provision within its constitution, if only
because of the drafting and deliberation costs involved on the part of the
constitutional coalition.71
The audiences for such constitutional signals may be both within the
state, namely the citizenry, and outside the state, namely treaty partners, in-
ternational organizations, and foreign publics.72 Note that we do not assert
that the strength of the signal (derived from the costliness of adoption) is
equivalent in its effect on these different audiences, or with respect to
whether it is sent by a democracy as opposed to an autocracy. But in all
cases, a constitution is used to communicate private information about the
policy goals of the constitutional coalition. And because it is a signal, adop-
tion of a constitutional promise raises the costs to the state of violating the
policy, even without formal enforcement. In this sense, constitutions express
commitments that may have greater credibility than ordinary laws, even if
they are not universally observed.
69. We recognize that the size and inclusiveness of this coalition vary widely across jurisdictions.
70. The recent adoption of property rights within the Chinese Constitution, for example, was widely
viewed as evidence that the Party was committed to incorporating capitalists into the governing coali-
tion. Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 6, at 175–76; see also Randall Peerenboom, The Social R
Foundations of China’s Living Constitution, in Comparative Constitutional Design 138, 144–45 (Tom
Ginsburg ed., 2012); Michael Dowdle & Stephanie Balme, Introduction,  in Constitutionalism in
China 1, 6 (Michael Dowdle & Stephanie Balme eds., 2009).
71. We recognize, of course, that not every country bears a very high cost of adopting constitutional
language. For some countries, particularly autocracies, the cost may be so low as to effectively render the
constitutional promise “cheap talk.” Note also that the “cost” of adoption might be lowered by incorpo-
rating the international instrument directly by reference. Some 43/655 of constitutional systems in the
CCP data (6.5%) have some sort of reference to a specific international human rights treaty. The most
general pattern (n = 35) is a vague reference in the preamble of the nature of “reaffirming the principles
of” the UDHR, sometimes along with other documents. This type of reference is prevalent in Africa and
is sometimes accompanied by a similar expression affirming the African Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Excluding these preamble cases leaves us only eight constitutional systems (1.2%) which involve incorpo-
rating the norms into what we might assume is the operative part of the constitution. These include
post-transitional countries: Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (2008), Somalia (2004), Nicaragua (1987), Argentina
(1994) (which includes the American Declaration), and Azerbaijan (1991). There is also what might be
called the Bolivarian pattern (Venezuela (1999), Bolivia (2009)), which incorporates only unnamed
“human rights treaties.” We can read this generously to include incorporation. The bottom line, how-
ever, is that the phenomenon is not very widespread.
72. Farber,  supra  note 68, at 83–98 (discussing benefits of signaling to investors and domestic
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In terms of sequence, some states will have well-established constitutional
rights in place before they adopt a treaty; for others, the treaty may precede
the adoption of constitutional rights. This Article is concerned primarily
with the effects of treaty ratification on domestic constitutions, and so we
focus on a temporal sequence in which treaty ratification occurs before full
adoption of all rights in a national constitution. In that sense, the relevant
question is: why would a constitutional coalition bother to repeat, in a na-
tional constitution, commitments that have already been made at the inter-
national level?
Signaling provides a partial account. If legal and treaty obligations are
signals, presumably the intensity of the signal increases with the number of
iterations of it. Thus, adopting a norm at both the international and domes-
tic levels reinforces the strength of the signal to the relevant audiences. In
that sense it is quite reasonable that a state would recommit to a right it has
already acceded to internationally. The international level helps to make
certain rights focal, in turn allowing states to coordinate their signaling
behavior around the international script. Note that it is not simply the case
that constitutions communicate to national audiences and treaties to inter-
national audiences. Indeed, it may be particularly helpful to international
audiences to observe the adoption of a norm in a national constitution,
which may be presumed by outsiders to be more enforceable than a treaty
enforced by the fairly weak international machinery.
Beyond signaling, however, there is the possibility that the adoption of
international norms in the local constitution supplements the international
adoption. Just as Gardbaum argues that the international level of rights
enforcement can provide gap-filling and supplementary rules for the domes-
tic constitutional level,73 so the reverse is also true. Domestic constitutional
adoption may incorporate more detailed rules, spelling out the right and its
limitations with greater specificity. Constitutional incorporation may also
provide institutional supplements: for developed countries, domestic consti-
tutions are usually seen as being enforced by well-regarded professional
judges, who may be better able to monitor the government than could the
more distant international machinery. At the same time, having some inter-
national enforcement can help address concerns that the local rights-enforc-
ers will be captured, as local groups interested in enforcing rights will have
multiple fora in which to challenge government behavior. Monitoring by
both international and local bodies can help inform actors at the other level
that a violation has occurred. Adopting a right at both levels, then, may be
useful, particularly for states that intend to enforce international promises
effectively.
73. Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l. L. 749,
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Of course, there is a possibility that the constitutional coalition might
treat the international obligation as a substitute for domestic institutions, so
that ratification of the international instrument precludes the need for adop-
tion at the domestic level (or vice versa). This might be because such adop-
tion at a second level would be redundant or unnecessary.74 A less charitable
interpretation would be that the international commitment provides a con-
venient cover for the states with no interest in actually enforcing the
promises embodied in rights provisions. If jurisdictions are seen as substi-
tutable (whatever the motive), the empirical prediction is largely of diver-
gence between national and international sets of rights.
In short, many kinds of states might like to signal commitment through
adoption of domestic norms to match international treaty commitments.
Those states that are interested in enforcement, however, are likely to seek to
supplement international obligations with domestic constitutional commit-
ments that make the promises more credible. It is not easy to distinguish
between these motives empirically and, moreover, it is quite likely that
states may be driven by both motives. In any case, at least one of these
motives supports a logical link among (1) international ratification, (2) do-
mestic constitutional commitment, and (3) actual enforcement of rights.
The signal of international ratification is intensified with domestic commit-
ment; the supplementary feature of the dual levels of obligation increases the
probability of actual enforcement.
What do the data say about these three behaviors? We begin by examin-
ing how the content of the ICCPR compares with that of constitutions that
came before or after. Figure 5 plots the similarity of 626 new constitutions
(almost three-fourths of the universe) to the ICCPR across time. Similarity
here is the proportion of the fifty-two ICCPR rights (more precisely, the
fifty-two ICCPR rights that are tracked in the CCP) that are incorporated in
a constitution in the year of its drafting. This measure is, therefore, different
from the measure of similarity employed earlier. Here the question is what
proportion of ICCPR rights are incorporated in a given constitution rather
than what proportion of a larger set of rights are shared between two docu-
ments. Constitutions in bold are those from countries that had ratified the
ICCPR at the time of their drafting.
74. Certain kinds of rights, for example, might be primarily directed at foreigners and, hence, secured
most effectively through international instruments. Few constitutions provide for a right to fair and
equitable treatment of foreign investors or the right to repatriate profits. For two examples, see Macedo-
nia (2011) Art. 59 (“Foreign investors are guaranteed the right to the free transfer of invested capital and
profits.”) and Croatia (1991) Art. 49 (“Foreign investors are guaranteed free transfer and repatriation of
the profits and the invested capital.”). Such provisions are hardly necessary given the extensive regulation
of such matters in bilateral and multilateral investment treaties. Embedding such rights in national
constitutions seems to provide little additional commitment value.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 25 11-FEB-13 15:01
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Figure 5: Similarity Between National Constitutions and the
ICCPR, by Ratification (bold) and Not (gray)
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We observe an abrupt increase in similarity to the ICCPR starting in
1948, the year of the UDHR (the content of which, of course, foreshadows
that of the ICCPR). Indeed, some of the most similar constitutions to the
ICCPR predate the treaty. For example, Zambia’s constitution of 1964 and
Cameroon’s of 1960 match the ICCPR on 88% and 89% of the treaty’s
rights, respectively. However, we observe an even more abrupt increase in
similarity following the drafting of the ICCPR in 1966. States would not
ratify the ICCPR until the 1970’s, at least, so the highly similar constitu-
tions in these early years are largely those of non-ratifiers. Ten or fifteen
years later, the highly similar cases are those of ratifiers. Incorporation of the
elements of the ICCPR into constitutions, then, comes well before ratifica-
tion for many countries, although ratification does appear to predict incor-
poration.75 This example only highlights the reciprocal relationship between
international covenants and domestic constitutions: constitution writers
working in years immediately prior to the official promulgation of a treaty
can anticipate and even influence the content of a treaty, which may in turn
influence other constitution makers in later years. One would expect that, to
some degree, a constitution’s similarity to the ICCPR would be a function of
the shared content between the country’s rights tradition and the ICCPR
(which, of course, is built from the constitutions of sovereign states). Figure
75. Interestingly, however, there appears to be a bipolar distribution in the post-ICCPR period. One
group is highly similar to the ICCPR, and another substantial group shows no effect at all.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 26 11-FEB-13 15:01
86 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 54
6 plots the similarity of post-1966 constitutions to the ICCPR on the y-axis
and the similarity of pre-1966 constitutions to the ICCPR on the x-axis,
with 1966 being the year of the ICCPR drafting. The analysis, of course,
leaves out a set of constitutions (about 100) whose countries did not have a
constitution in force prior to 1966 (or at least constitutions that do not
appear in the CCP data before 1966). Again, ratifiers are in bold and non-
ratifiers in gray. As Figure 6 indicates, the relationship between post-1966
similarity and pre-1966 similarity is a strong one (b~.5 for both groups).
Nonetheless, the vertical gap (about .08) in the lines fitted to each group of
points suggests a reasonably strong effect of ratification.
Figure 6: Similarity of Post-1966 Constitutions to the ICCPR, by
Similarity of the Pre-1966 Constitution to the ICCPR
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To test this more formally, we estimate a random-effects model that takes
into account within-country and across-country effects (Table 2). The depen-
dent variable is still similarity to the ICCPR and the cases are new constitu-
tions drafted between 1789 and 2006. The unit of analysis is not the
country-year, but rather the constitution, and we take into account serial
correlation across constitutions within countries that have a historical series
of constitutions. Given the heterogeneity in the time period under analysis,
we include three time variables: (1) a dummy variable identifying a drafting
date in the post-1966 era, (2) a dummy variable indicating the same in the
post-1948 era, and (3) a trend term, that is calculated as the difference be-
tween the year of the constitution’s drafting and 1789 (the year of the\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 27 11-FEB-13 15:01
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“first” modern constitution). We would expect a bump in similarity after
the introduction of the UDHR and after that of the ICCPR, as well as a
general trend towards similarity to the ICCPR across the entire 200 years.
The results corroborate all three expectations. We also add to the model a
one-unit (that is, one-constitution) lag of the dependent variable (the simi-
larity score of the previous constitution from that country). Remember that
the model, which assesses within-country effects, already assumes that con-
stitutions within a country’s series will be similar to one another. With
these controls, the ICCPR ratification coefficient is .08, which is just what it
looked like in the scatter plot in Figure 6.76 Having ratified the ICCPR,
then, is associated with an increase of almost ten points in a constitution’s
similarity to the ICCPR, controlling for the era and a country’s prior consti-
tutional tradition vis-` a-vis the ICCPR.
Table 2: Explaining the Similarity of Constitutions to
the ICCPR77
Universe: National constitutions written after 1789
Variable Coefficient (s.e.)
ICCPR Ratification 0.080
(0.022)
Post-1966 0.064
(0.021)
Post-1948 0.046
(0.024)
Years since 1789 0.002
(<.001)
Similarity (c-1)78 0.049
(0.044)
Constant 0.070
(0.030)
Constitutions 626
Countries 192
R-squared (between units) 0.46
In short, countries that ratify the ICCPR are decidedly more likely to
bring their constitutions in line with the ICCPR. Even though we control
76. A fixed-effect model suggests an even stronger effect of .12.
77. Random-effects model with constitutions as the unit of analysis and countries as the cross-
sectional groups. Standard errors are in parentheses.
78. This is the dependent variable scored for the prior constitution.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-FEB-13 15:01
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for the historical predisposition of a country’s constitutional law in this
equation, we might still worry about endogeneity. That is, are the ratifiers
simply those countries whose constitutional predisposition is already in line
with the ICCPR? This does not appear to be the case. Across the 150 or so
constitutions written since 1966 for which we have data on the prior consti-
tution in force in 1965, there is no significant mean difference in similarity
to the ICCPR in 1965 between countries that ultimately ratify and those
that do not.79 That is to say, convergence to the ICCPR in a country’s con-
stitutional trajectory occurs only after ratification.
V. Ratification, Incorporation, and Rights Performance:
Evidence on the Power of Legal Complementarity
In this section we explore the effect of treaties and constitutional rights
on actual compliance, or performance. Our theory—to recapitulate briefly—
implies that treaties work largely by mobilizing domestic forces, which, in
turn, encourage the incorporation of treaty commitments into domestic
law.80 We view constitutions, therefore, as mediating some portion of the
effect of treaties on compliance, while we recognize that the treaties and
constitutions will have a direct effect on compliance. We provide a test of
this system of equations here. In summary, we have already shown some
evidence that (1) constitutional drafters working under the shadow of the
UDHR are more likely to provide for UDHR rights than they are non-
UDHR rights and (2) drafters of post-1966 constitutions who have ratified
the ICCPR (one of the legal manifestations of the UDHR) are more likely to
incorporate ICCPR rights than are their contemporaries who have not rati-
fied the ICCPR.
Still, skepticism about these effects may persist for a variety of reasons.
First, we have looked only at the work of constitution makers who are re-
placing (wholesale) the extant constitution. It could be that less comprehen-
sive revisions (amendments but also interpretive changes) also serve to
incorporate the ICCPR (that is, constitutional replacement is only part of
the domestic mechanism of incorporating treaty rights). We also have not
taken into account the possibility—however remote—that ICCPR ratifica-
tion itself triggers the replacement of a constitution. That is, it could be
that ratification affects not only the character of new constitutions but the
likelihood that they are written in the first place.81 These two possibilities
suggest that our analysis makes for a rather conservative test of the overall
effect of treaties. If either of the aforementioned possibilities—unobserved
incorporation or endogenous constitutional replacement—are operating,
79. Unreported results, on file with authors.
80. See Simmons, supra note 7. R
81. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, supra note 6, chapters 5–6, have developed models of constitu-
tional replacement, which might allow us to test this, but for now we leave this question aside.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 29 11-FEB-13 15:01
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then the influence of treaties on the content of constitutions may be even
more pronounced than anything our analysis suggests.
We therefore have good reason to suspect that treaty ratification influ-
ences the content of national constitutions. We note also the parallel work
by Simmons which clearly shows that treaty ratification leads to compliance
along a host of domains (from fair trials to women’s rights).82 Here we test
the indirect effect of ICCPR ratification on civil liberty protection through
the intervening mechanism of constitutional incorporation of civil liberties.
Our outcome measure of compliance is the civil liberties index from Free-
dom House, which has coverage from 1972 and therefore coincides reasona-
bly well with the lifespan of the ICCPR. We construct a de jure version of
the Freedom House index by matching each of the fifteen ingredients that
Freedom House coders purportedly use to rate countries to each of fifteen
constitutional provisions. These de jure and de facto measures of civil liberties,
then, match fairly well.83
In the standard approach to assessing intervening variable models,84 es-
tablishing evidence of mediation requires three conditions to hold: (1) the
treatment variable (here, ICCPR ratification) influences the outcome varia-
ble (rights compliance); (2) each variable in the causal chain influences the
one after it when all prior variables, including the treatment, are controlled;
and (3) the treatment variable does not affect the outcome after the interven-
ing variable (incorporation in national constitutions) is controlled. This last
condition assumes complete mediation; in most cases, like ours, it is not
supposed that the treatment exerts an effect only through the intervening
variable. Indeed, we suspect that treaty ratification exerts influence over and
above any effect mediated by domestic law.
In our case, this sort of analysis implies three regression equations, the
results of which are in Table 3. The first column reports the results of a
regression predicting constitutional civil liberties with ICCPR ratification
and a number of control variables. The second column reports the results of
a regression predicting civil liberty compliance with the complementary set
of constitutional civil liberty provisions and some control variables. And the
third column reports a regression predicting compliance with both treaty
ratification and constitutional provisions.85 The results are consistent with a
82. See Simmons, supra note 7.
83. It is likely that our aggregation method (an additive index of the fifteen items) departs from
whatever aggregation method the Freedom House coders use. The Freedom House method is not pub-
licly available.
84. E.g., Reuben Baron & David Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychologi-
cal Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1173, 1176
(1986).
85. These are random-effects models that include, importantly, a measure of the state’s predisposition
to sign the ICCPR, as measured by the similarity of the state’s constitution to the ICCPR in 1965.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 30 11-FEB-13 15:01
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theory of constitutional mediation of treaty effects, although both treaties
and constitutions exert their own influence on compliance as well.86
That is, the first equation suggests that treaty ratification has a noticeable
effect (b = .102) on the provision of civil liberties in constitutions— an effect
that is consistent with our related findings of ratification effects above. The
dependent variable in the first equation is scaled to range from 0 to 1; the
.102 increase associated with treaty ratification, which is equivalent to one
standard deviation in the dependent variable, is strong. In turn, the second
equation suggests that civil liberty provisions in constitutions have a de-
cided effect (b = .134) on compliance, which is also scaled to range from 0
to 1. The third equation, finally, suggests that the treaty effect on compli-
ance is both independent (b = .053) and mediated through civil liberty
provisions in constitutions whose effect remains strong (b = .121) even in
the presence of treaty ratification. Certainly, these relationships deserve a
closer look and more analysis, but our findings here tell a clear story of
treaties working both through constitutions as well as independently to
change human rights behavior.
86. This simple analysis of the causal steps, however, does not allow us to test the joint significance of
the causal paths, nor to estimate the indirect effect of ratification on compliance or the confidence inter-
val surrounding that estimate.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 31 11-FEB-13 15:01
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Table 3: Explaining Civil Liberty Provisions and
Civil Liberty Compliance87
Universe: Independent states (1972–2006)
Civil Liberty Civil Liberty
Provision Compliance
(1) (2) (3)
ICCPR Ratification (t-1) 0.102 0.053
(9.48) (6.84)
GDP per capita -0.051 0.058 0.002
(1.15) (1.99) (0.07)
Democracy (Polity) (t-1) 0.238
(13.12)
Logged population 0.073 -0.025 -0.040
(6.25) (2.86) (4.52)
Percent urban 0.139 0.431 0.369
(2.25) (9.06) (7.66)
Official religion 0.306 -0.022 -0.017
(15.68) (1.49) (1.16)
ICCPR Predisposition 0.015 -0.001 -0.001
(5.72) (0.52) (0.40)
Civil liberty provisions 0.134 0.121
(12.06) (10.81)
Constant -0.481 0.540 0.672
(4.49) (6.69) (8.20)
Observations 3977 3712 3712
Number of countries 120 127 127
N.B. Cells represent regression coefficients with t-scores in parentheses.
VI. Conclusion
Our analysis has focused on the impact of international treaty ratification
on domestic constitutional adoption of rights, and the effect of both levels of
legal obligation on actual rights protection. We focus on two leading inter-
national human rights instruments, the UDHR and the ICCPR, and find
that they have had an important coordinating role in terms of the pattern of
rights adoption in subsequently enacted national constitutions. Constitution
writers working under the umbrella of international rights treaties are more
87. Random-effects model, with t-stats in parentheses.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 32 11-FEB-13 15:01
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likely to pattern their documents after the international instruments, but
they are even more likely to do so if their country has ratified the instru-
ment. These findings are consistent with a view in which international in-
struments provide a focal set of norms for constitution makers. In our
theory, a focal set makes perfect sense if the state is choosing to strengthen
the signals it sent earlier in its signing of the international treaty and/or it is
choosing to build domestic legal machinery necessary for the enforcement of
the rights in question. It is worth noting that, on balance, constitution mak-
ers are not following some sort of substitution approach, in which they
choose to omit the same rights from a newly written constitution that they
had committed to in an international treaty.
Actual rights compliance is the last and most important piece of this
puzzle, of course. Does duplication of ICCPR rights in a country’s constitu-
tion lead to increased compliance? We find that, while both treaties and
constitutions exert their own direct influence on compliance, there also ap-
pears to be a distinct mediating effect of constitutions on actual rights pro-
tection. In other words, one way in which international norms work is
through adoption in national constitutional texts. This result is consistent
with a theory that constitutions and international treaties supplement each
other in terms of enforcement mechanisms. Adoption of a norm at both
levels increases the probability that the norm will actually be enforced,
probably—in our view—because it provides multiple monitors and alterna-
tive fora in which to challenge government behavior. One implication is
that proponents of international human rights regimes should encourage
adoption of core norms into domestic constitutions, so as to increase the
probability of effective enforcement.
The connection between the ratification of international instruments and
national constitutions also implicates problems of the simultaneous opera-
tion of multiple levels of regulatory authority. While duplication of rules,
say between a state and national constitution, may seem to be wasteful, it
also has the potential to reinforce effective implementation.
In more general terms, our results contribute to the important project of
unpacking and tracing the implications of international law in domestic law
and politics. We know from recent analyses that domestic mobilization is
crucial for the efficacy of international norms.88 We have shown that consti-
tutions provide one channel through which domestic mobilization can oc-
cur. Getting to rights, it seems, may require taking multiple paths.
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Appendix: Percentage of Constitutions that Include Selected
Rights, by Era89 (n=549)
Constitutions that Include Right (%)
1789–1914 1915–1948 1949–2006
Right90 (CCP Variable Name in all caps) (n=122) (n=104) (n=350)
ARMS: The right to bear arms 8.2 3.8 1.4
ASSEM: Freedom of assembly 49.2 87.5 85.7
ASSOC: Freedom of association 43.4 85.6 87.4
ASYLUM: Provisions for the protection of stateless persons 14.8 16.3 42.0
BUSINES: The right to conduct/establish a business 23.0 32.7 26.3
CAPPUN: Restrictions on the use of capital punishment 19.7 34.6 22.9
CENSOR: Prohibition of censorship 47.5 37.5 24.0
CHILDPRO: Guarantee of the rights of children 2.5 22.1 43.1
CHILDWRK: Limits on child employment 1.6 26.0 21.1
CITDEP: Grant to the government of the right to deport
citizens 7.4 19.2 40.0
CITREN: The right of citizens to renounce their citizenship 1.6 6.7 16.6
CITSUFF_1: Jus soli citizenship 59.0 44.1 30.5
CONRIGHT: Mention of consumer rights or consumer
protection 1.6 1.9 10.6
CORPPUN: Prohibition on the use of corporal punishment 32.0 21.2 7.1
COUNS: The right to counsel if one is indicted 11.5 20.2 64.0
CRUELTY: Prohibition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment 25.4 25.0 57.7
CULTRGHT: Reference to a state duty to protect or
promote culture 3.3 25.0 52.6
DEBTORS: Prohibition on the detention of debtors 10.7 20.2 13.4
DEVLPERS: Provision for an individual’s right to self
development 0.8 1.0 22.3
DOUBJEP: Prohibition of double jeopardy 12.3 19.2 36.6
EXAMWIT: The right to examine evidence or confront all 11.5 4.8 23.1
EXPOST: Prohibition of punishment by laws enacted ex post 56.6 45.2 70.9
EXPRESS: Freedom of expression or speech 68.9 83.7 86.9
FAIRTRI: The right to a fair trial 4.9 4.8 32.9
89. Era is classified by the promulgation date of the constitution.
90. Labels for rights are taken directly from the CCP Survey Instrument. Comparative Constitutions
Project, supra note 14. Rights are coded as “provided” or “not provided,” with conditional provisions
coded as “provided.” Further information on this dichotomous coding is available from the authors.\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 34 11-FEB-13 15:01
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FALSEIMP: The right to some redress in cases of false
imprisonment 9.8 14.4 30.9
FNDFAM: The right to found a family 0.8 13.5 23.7
FREECOMP: The right to a free and/or competitive market 3.3 6.7 16.6
FREEMOVE: Freedom of movement 54.1 56.7 74.9
FREEREL: Freedom of religion 50.0 87.5 88.9
HABCORP: The right to protection from unjustified
restraint 41.8 57.7 71.4
HEALTHF: Specification that healthcare should be provided
at state expense 0.0 3.8 16.9
HEALTHR: Mention of the right to health care 0.0 13.5 38.3
INFOACC: Right of an individual to view government
information 1.6 1.9 18.0
INHERIT: Inheritance rights 3.3 16.3 28.0
INTPROP: Intellectual property rights 39.3 34.6 20.9
JOINTRDE: The right to form or to join trade unions 4.1 32.7 69.4
JURY: Requirement of a jury or any form of citizen
participation in criminal trials 36.9 22.1 14.3
JUVENILE: Provision for juveniles of special rights/status in
criminal process 0.8 3.8 10.9
LEISURE: A right of rest and leisure 3.3 32.7 37.4
LIBEL: The right of protection of one’s reputation 13.9 11.5 21.7
LIFE: A right to life 23.8 39.4 60.3
MARRIAGE: The right to marry 8.2 20.2 22.6
MATEQUAL: Provision for matrimonial equality 0.0 12.5 26.0
MIRANDA: A right of the accused to silence or protection
from self-incrimination 40.2 35.6 39.7
NOMIL: A right to exemption from military service for
conscientious objectors 2.5 0.0 14.9
OCCUPATE: The right to choose one’s occupation 34.4 41.3 39.7
OPINION: Freedom of opinion, thought, and conscience 60.7 71.2 76.3
PETITION: A right of petition 73.8 73.1 46.9
PREREL: The right/possibility of pretrial release 23.0 19.2 20.9
PRESINOC: A presumption of innocence in trials 5.7 8.7 60.3
PRESS: Freedom of the press 44.3 54.8 53.4
PRISONRG: Requirement that the names of those
imprisoned be recorded in a register 1.6 1.0 2.0
PRIVACY: A right of privacy 47.5 68.3 72.9
PROPRGHT: A right to own property 49.2 67.3 75.1
PROVHLTH: Mention of a state duty to provide health care 1.6 19.2 35.7
PROVWORK: Mention of a state duty to provide work/
employment 0.8 13.5 14.9
PUBTRI: A general requirement of public trials 33.6 42.3 57.7\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 35 11-FEB-13 15:01
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REMUNER: The right to just remuneration, fair
compensation, etc. 4.9 16.3 43.7
RGHTAPP: The right of defendants to appeal judicial
decisions 10.7 11.5 30.6
SAFEWORK: The right to safe/healthy working environment 4.9 14.4 26.6
SAMESEXM: The right for same-sex marriages 0.0 0.0 0.0
SCIFREE: A right to enjoy the benefits of science 0.8 0.0 10.0
SELFDET: A people’s right of self determination 0.0 8.7 12.6
SEPREL: An explicit decree of separation of church and state 3.3 17.3 24.0
SHELTER: The right to shelter or housing 0.8 6.7 19.4
SLAVE: Prohibition of slavery, servitude, or forced labor 50.8 27.9 42.6
SPEEDTRI: The right to a speedy trial 5.7 7.7 24.3
STANDLIV: A right to an adequate or reasonable standard of
living 0.0 13.5 20.9
STRIKE: A right to strike 1.6 13.5 39.1
TESTATE: A right of testacy, or the right to leave property
to one’s heirs 8.2 4.8 7.4
TORTURE: Prohibition of torture 28.7 26.0 58.0
TRANSFER: The right to transfer property freely 17.2 8.7 13.7
TRILANG: Specification that a trial has to be in a language
of the accused 0.0 6.7 31.4
WOLAW: Mention of nulla poena sine lege or equivalent 54.1 58.7 63.7\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-1\HLI102.txt unknown Seq: 36 11-FEB-13 15:01